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Abstract
In this paper, I build on (Blackmore 2000) to propose a formal theory of demographic
transition (fertility decline) and associated growth of the stock of knowledge. The novelty of
this theory is to entirely exclude private consumption from the objective function of the decision
makers, and to assume that their goal is to maximize their social influence, that is, the number of
people in the next generation utilizing their ideas. With high communication costs, one’s ideas
are utilized mainly by his/her children, which creates an incentive to have as many children as
possible. With modern communication technologies, one’s ideas can be used by millions, which
makes people invest time into improvement of own ideas rather than production of children.
Even those who can influence only their own children are induced to have smaller families and
improve own ideas, because their children now have access not only to ideas of parents but also
to ideas from the outside world.
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1 Motivation
In the last ten or fifteen years, demographers have increasingly argued that one important deter-
minant of fertility decline is social influence exerted on high-fertility societies by the outside world.
People who have been exposed to the ideas delivered by the outside world are choosing to have
smaller families. For example, (Axinn and Barber 2001) discover that proximity of young girls in
rural Nepal to a school, controlling for their subsequent attendance of the school and their future
husbands’ attendance of the school, has a negative impact on their subsequent fertility. (Axinn and
Yabiku 2001), from the same data, discover that proximity to such public places as a market or a
bus stop during childhood increase the rate of contraception among women.
A good example of the opposite phenomenon – little contact with the outside world and high
fertility – is Amish community in the United States. They voluntarily abstain from modern com-
munication devices such as phones and television, as well as from modern vehicles and travel
opportunities. Such an abstention effectively limits the number of people with whom Amish com-
munity members can interact, and increase the frequency of interaction with parents and other
close relatives. At the same time, Amish families are very large. (Greksa 2002) estimates fertility
among Old Order Amish at 7.7 children per woman, which makes Amish community one of the
fastest-growing communities in the world, and certainly the fastest-growing community among the
OECD countries.
In this paper, I propose a formal theory of demographic transition (fertility decline) that relates
the outside social influence with fertility choices of the decision makers. Conventional economic the-
ories of demographic transition are ill-equipped to modeling social influence: it is usually assumed
that economic agents rationally maximize utility based on personal consumption and, occasion-
ally, include children’s consumption with a smaller weight (e.g. (Becker 1960), (Becker, Murphy
and Tamura 1990), (Caldwell 1976), (Galor and Moav 2002)). The novelty of my theory is to
abstract from consumption-based utility, and to embed social influence directly into individuals’
utility function. The next paragraph outlines the theory in greater detail.
Every agent creates two types of output over his lifetime: ideas and children, each of which
require a time input to produce. Since time is a limited resource, there exists a tradeoff between
the quality of ideas and the number of children produced by an agent. Production of ideas requires
absorption of ideas created by the previous generation; the goal of agents is to maximize their social
influence, that is, the extent to which their own ideas have been absorbed by the next generation.
Higher-quality ideas are absorbed more intensively, which creates an incentive to spend more time
on development of ideas and have fewer children. Having more children, however, increases the
number of people in the next generation utilizing one’s ideas, which creates incentives to have more
children and spend less time on development of ideas.
In traditional societies, non-relatives are isolated from each other, and children absorb ideas
of their own parents regardless of the quality of these ideas. This creates incentives for parents
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to save time on development of ideas and have as many children as possible. In modern societies,
learning from non-parents (and therefore teaching non-children) is nearly as easy as learning from
parents, which makes demand for one’s ideas more elastic and induces people to spend more time on
development of their own ideas and thus have fewer children. In an extension of the model, I show
that fertility declines even when people cannot influence the outside world themselves, but their
children are influenced by the outside world. Too fertile, and therefore too uneducated, parents
will not be able to influence even their own children in the presence of ideological competitors from
the outside world.
1.1 Social influence versus social learning
While the effect of informational exposure to the outside world on fertility causes little doubt
among demographers, the precise mechanism of how the former affects the latter is less obvious.
This paper models the social influence mechanism, that is, families exposed to the outside world
are less willing to have children. An alternative mechanism is social learning, according to which
high fertility in traditional societies occurs not because parents are willing to have many children,
but because they do not know how to control fertility. Interaction with the outside world brings
knowledge of contraception techniques, and thus lowers fertility.
To find out which of the two factors – social influence or social learning – is significant in practice,
(Behrman, Kohler and Watkins 2002) conduct a detailed empirical analysis of rural households in
Kenya, and find that both play a significant role; social learning is relatively more important in more
developed (urbanized) areas, while social influence plays a role in more remote places. This finding
can be interpreted as follows: in urban areas, the willingness to have smaller families emerged
before ability to control fertility; thus, fertility declines due to acquisition of new “skills” rather
than changes in preferences over the family size. In more remote places, it is not (in)ability but
(un)willingness to control family size that is most important for fertility.
An additional evidence for this argument comes from (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996): they show
that countries that entered demographic transition fairly late for their level of development (e.g.
Latin American countries), had experienced faster decline of fertility than other countries. By the
time of the beginning of the fertility decline, Latin American countries apparently had already
been influenced by the Western world and had unfulfilled demand for small families; social learning
allowed them to rapidly meet their demand. In less developed countries, fertility declines more
slowly, apparently because it is driven not by social learning but by social influence which operates
more slowly.
Thus, we may conclude, while social learning does play a role in fertility decline, social influence
is a more fundamental factor of fertility change. After all, Amish community members who live
in the middle of the most advanced civilization have easy access to all contraception techniques
they need; their large family sizes are determined by (lack of) social influence, rather than lack of
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knowledge about contraception.
1.2 The willingness to influence: evidence and theoretical background
One of key innovations of this paper is to assume that people care about their social influence
rather than their consumption of goods and services. In this section, I justify this assumption.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that many people care about their own lifetime legacy
being utilized by the next generations. In pre-industrial societies, many fathers wanted their sons
to continue their family business. Many elderly people want their values to be absorbed by younger
generations. There are countless examples of people giving up their wealth, or even risking their
lives, for the sake of defending and popularizing their ideology. Most scientists want their research
to be cited, even when their own wealth no longer depends on the number of citations. Suicide
bombers sacrifice their lives in exchange for high respect in their community.
Modern Economics originates from Adam Smith who defined the objective of people as the
maximization of personal wealth; Adam Smith himself, however, did not seem to maximize his
wealth: writing “The Wealth of Nations ” took twelve years of Smith’s life, between age 41 and 53,
and was probably in contemplation twelve years prior to that (Rae 2006 (1895)). Thus, developing
his theory took a quarter of Smith’s life; the monetary reward for his effort was 300 pounds
(Rae 2006 (1895)), which was equivalent to his yearly income. Moreover, given eighteenth-century
life expectancy, it was not obvious at all that Smith will be able to complete his project and receive
his monetary reward. Thus, we may conclude, engaging is such an extensive project was probably
not the first-best income maximization strategy. Adam Smith’s behavior is rational if his objective
was to maximize his social influence (in which he was highly successful); if he was a selfish Homo
economicus, he should probably not have written his book.
Why is the desire to influence so strong that it may cause people to sacrifice their biological
fitness? Below, I outline an evolutionary explanation. For most of their evolutionary history,
humans lived in small groups of less than one hundred people, with very limited contact between
the groups (Cosmides and Tooby 1994). Evolutionary psychology suggests that human preferences
must have been “hard-wired” to living in such environment (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). In such
traditional societies, highly regarded individuals were likely to become patriarchs and matriarchs
(Newson, Postmes, Lea andWebley 2005), that is, their ideological fitness could have been positively
correlated with biological fitness, which could cause an emergence of preference for social influence.
Modern environment, however, is very different from the environment in which human psychology
has evolved: thanks to travel possibilities and mass-media, humans routinely interact, personally
and impersonally, with thousands of people; some celebrities influence the minds of millions. In
this new environment, the preference for social influence is maladaptation from the standpoint of
genetic fitness: the desire to become a patriarch with many children has been replaced by the desire
to become a top manager, or a movie star, or a top scientist, or a politician, which requires having
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Figure 1: Preference for social influence: an illustration
a small family and spending a lot of time at work. Figure 1 illustrates the argument.
Two influential theories – memetics (Dawkins 2006 (1976)), (Blackmore 2000) and dual inher-
itance theory (Boyd and Richerson 1985) make a clear distinction between humans and all other
species: humans are unique in their ability to imitate one another’s behavior and communicate
information. Only humans can directly copy goals and motor patterns of each other (Henrich and
Gil-White 2001); in the language of this paper, only humans are able to absorb each other’s ideas.
Thus, humans are the only species that are able to produce not only biological, but also ideologi-
cal offspring; therefore, humans are the only species that may theoretically deviate from standard
Darwinian incentive of producing as many biological offspring as possible.
Dual inheritance theory does not suggest that being imitated is the objective of humans; imi-
tation of the most successful peers is a skill that benefits the imitators, but has no effect on those
being imitated. Memetics assumes that humans brains are infected by “viruses of the mind”, or
memes, whose only goal is to get copied into other brains; the role of humans is diminished to
simply hosting the memes and doing what is best for them. This research is similar to memetics
in the sense that humans are willing to seed their ideas into as many brains as possible; however, I
abstract from empirically unobserved memes and assume that humans themselves desire to spread
their ideas. Otherwise, the ideology of this research is similar to that of (Blackmore 2000) who
offers a “memetic” theory of demographic transition: in isolated communities, memes cannot go
far, and the “standard” genetic incentive to have as many children as possible dominates; small-
family communities simply become extinct. When long-distance communication becomes available,
people spend more time sending out their memes and thus have smaller families.
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2 Model
2.1 Basics
The environment is characterized by non-overlapping generations1 indexed by t. Each generation
t is populated by a continuum Gt of agents.
Members of two consecutive generations are linked to each other by parent-child relationship:
each child has one parent.2 Formally, I define a parental operator C : Gt−1 → Gt such that for
every i ∈ Gt−1, C(i) is the set of all children of i.
2.2 Constraints
I describe an individual’s problem in a somewhat unusual way: I first present their constraints and
then define the utility function. Each individual j ∈ Gt,∀t is endowed with L units of time that
can be separated into two activities: learning Lj and production of children. I assume that raising
each child takes ν units of parent’s time, so an individual j who has nj children has the following
budget constraint:
Lj + νnj ≤ L (1)
Note that individuals are allowed to choose non-integer number of children, which can be
interpreted as follows. While the choice of parents nj may be non-integer, the actual number
of children is a multinomial random variable with an expectation of nj. As defined below, parents
are risk neutral with respect to the number of children, and thus the variance in the number of
children is immaterial: any mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the number of children
does not change parents’ decisions. Also, I assume that the time burden of raising children depends
on expected value nj, rather than on actual realization.
Each individual j ∈ Gt is characterized by the quality qj of his idea. In this stylized model,
we assume for simplicity there is only one idea per person, which represents all intellectual legacy
produced by that individual over his or her lifetime. To develop an idea, j has to absorb ideas
developed by the previous generation. This assumption relies on the fact that knowledge accumu-
lation is a social activity; the most successful ideas “stand on the shoulders of giants” rather than
are developed in isolation. The parent of j has a strictly positive influence on the formation of
j’s idea, while everybody else in generation t− 1 (denote them non-parents) have an infinitesimal
impact on j. Given that there is a continuum of non-parents, all of them together have a sizeable
1It is more intuitive to assume that generations do overlap, so that younger generation could absorb ideas of living
members of the older generation. Non-overlapping generations structure was introduced to simplify exposition of the
model.
2I abstract from genders in the model; see (Becker et al. 1990) and (Galor and Moav 2002) for similar assumptions
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impact on the formation of j’s idea. Formally,
qj =
(
M
(
qC−1(j)xC−1(j)j
)γ
+
∫
i∈Gt−1\C−1(j)
(qixij)
γ di
) 1
γ
(2)
Here M is a positive constant which shows the weight of a parent, relative to non-parents, in
the formation of one’s idea; C−1(j) indicates the parent of j; xij > 0 is the intensity of j’s learning
from i ∈ Gt−1: it indicates to what extent individual j has absorbed i’s ideas. While qi are given
for the person j, he is free to choose his learning intensities xij subject to a time constraint outlined
below.
Absorbtion of ideas incurs a time cost of τij per unit of learning intensity. The total amount of
time spent on learning from all sources must add up to Lj:
MxC−1(j)jτC−1(j)j +
∫
i∈Gt−1\C−1(j)
xijτijdi = Lj (3)
I assume that the time cost of learning from one’s parent is fixed and is normalized to unity:
τC−1(j)j ≡ 1,∀j ∈ Gt,∀t (4)
The time cost of learning from non-parents may vary; the main goal of this research is to study the
effect of changes in the cost of learning from non-parents on family size.
2.3 Objective function
Finally, I define the objective function of individuals. I assume that individuals are willing to
maximize the extent to which their idea has been utilized by the next generation; they place a special
emphasis on their own children. More formally, the extent to which j’s child has absorbed his/her
ideas has a strictly positive weight on j’s utility, while each of non-children has an infinitesimal
impact. Since there is a continuum of non-children, all of them combined have a sizeable effect on
j’s utility:
Uj∈Gt = njMxjC(j) +
∫
k∈Gt+1\C(j)
xjkdk (5)
Given that all children of any given j are identical, by xjC(j) I mean, with a slight abuse of notation,
the intensity of learning from j by his representative child. Note that nj is (generically) non-integer
expected number of children, hence the above formula describes the expected utility rather than its
actual realization.
Note that individual j does not choose the learning intensities of the next generation xjk; the
control parameters of j are the learning time Lj, the number of children nj, and his own learning
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intensities xij for i ∈ Gt−1.
3 Analysis
3.1 Optimal learning intensities
It is intuitively obvious and is formally shown below that the intensity of learning xjk of k ∈ Gt+1
from j ∈ Gt is increasing with the quality qj of j’s idea; therefore, for any given value of learning
time Lj individual j attempts to achieve the highest possible qj. This allows us to find the optimal
learning intensities xij from every teacher i. By maximizing (2) subject to (3) over all xij,∀i ∈ Gt,
we come up with the optimal learning intensities (see appendix A for derivation). Before presenting
the solution, it is convenient to define the following variable:
Ej ≡M
(
qC−1(j)
) γ
1−γ +
∫
i∈Gt−1\C−1(j)
(
qi
τij
) γ
1−γ
di (6)
The variable Ej describes the learning environment of individual j: it shows how smart j’s potential
teachers are, and how easy it is to absorb their ideas. By definition, Ej does not depend on j’s
decisions and is taken by him as given.
Now, we are equipped to demonstrate the optimal learning intensities:
xij =
Lj
Ej
q
γ
1−γ
i τ
− 1
1−γ
ij (7)
Learning intensity of j from i increases linearly with the overall length of education Lj ; it increases
with the quality of teacher’s idea qi (as claimed above), decreases with learning cost τij. Learning
intensity from any given teacher also decreases as the overall learning environment Ej improves.
From (2) and (7), we can also compute the optimal (highest possible) quality of j’s idea given
the learning time Lj :
qj =
Lj
Ej
(
M
(
qC−1(j)
) γ
1−γ +
∫
i∈Gt−1\C−1(j)
(
qi
τij
) γ
1−γ
di
) 1
γ
=
Lj
Ej
E
1
γ
j
= E
1−γ
γ
j Lj (8)
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Using (8), we can rewrite (7) and (6):
xij =
Lj
Ej
EiL
γ
1−γ
i τ
− 1
1−γ
ij (9)
Ej = MEC−1(j)
(
LC−1(j)
) γ
1−γ +
∫
i∈Gt−1\C−1(j)
Ei
(
Li
τij
) γ
1−γ
di (10)
Using (1) and (9), we can rewrite (5) as follows:
Uj = L
γ
1−γ
j Ej
[
M
L− Lj
ν
LC(j)
EC(j)
+
∫
k∈Gt+1\C(j)
Lk
Ek
τ
− 1
1−γ
jk dk
]
(11)
The objective of individual j ∈ Gt is to maximize (11) over Lj, keeping in mind that Ek, k ∈ Gt+1
depend on Lj. The relationship between the latter two can be described by extrapolating (10) one
generation forward:
Ek =MEC−1(k)L
γ
1−γ
C−1(k)
+
∫
j′∈Gt\C−1(k)
Ej′
(
Lj′
τj′k
) γ
1−γ
dj′ (12)
When k is a child of j (k ∈ C(j)), the above formula simplifies to
EC(j) =MEjL
γ
1−γ
j +
∫
j′∈Gt\j
Ej′
(
Lj′
τj′k
) γ
1−γ
dj′ (13)
When k is a child of j, Lj has a sizeable effect on k’s learning environment; otherwise, the effect
of Lj on Ek is negligible: j is one of continuum of non-parents of k that affect it.
3.2 Symmetric learning environment
Definition 1 Symmetric learning environment occurs when all members of any given generation
have the same learning environment: Ei = Ej ≡ Et,∀i ∈ Gt,∀j ∈ Gt,∀t
In the rest of the paper, we will only deal with symmetric learning environment. For this
environment, the following several results can be established.
Proposition 1 In symmetric learning environment, one’s utility does not depend on his or her
learning environment
Intuitively, a better learning environment (smarter ancestors or easier access to the knowledge of
ancestors) makes not only j ∈ Gt, but also all his contemporaries smarter; as a result, the influence
of j on the next generation remains the same as before.
Proof. Consider the learning environment of an agents k ∈ Gt+1 shown in (12). It depends on
learning environments of agents from the previous generation t. If the latter have the same learning
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environments, they can be factored out in (12):
Et+1 ≡ Ek = Et
(
ML
γ
1−γ
C−1(k)
+
∫
j′∈T (k)
(
Lj′
τ
) γ
1−γ
dj′
)
,∀k ∈ Gt+1 (14)
Now, consider the utility of an agent j ∈ Gt shown in (11). It is proportional to his own learning
environment Ej ≡ Et. It also depends on learning environments of the next generation Ek, k ∈ Gt+1,
which, by assumption, are equal to each other and thus can be factored out in the expression for
utility:
Uj = L
γ
1−γ
j
Et
Et+1
[
M
L− Lj
ν
LC(j) +
∫
k∈Gt+1\C(j)
Lkτ
− 1
1−γ
jk dk
]
(15)
where Et+1 is the learning environment of some representative k ∈ Gt+1. From (14), Et+1 is
proportional to Et, which means that the latter cancels out from the expression for utility (15).
Thus, one’s utility does not depend on his learning environment.
Independence of utility on one’s learning environment allows us to establish the following im-
portant result.
Proposition 2 Members of generation t, when making optimal learning choices, treat the learning
choices of the next generation as given. Formally, dLk
dLj
= 0,∀j ∈ Gt,∀k ∈ Gt+1,∀t
Proof. From Proposition 1, it follows that the utility of j ∈ Gt, and thus his optimal learning
time Lj, do not depend on his learning environment:
dLj
dEj
= 0. By extrapolating this result one
generation forward, we get dLk
dEk
= 0,∀k ∈ Gt+1. Therefore, learning decisions of j, which affect the
learning environment of k, do not affect the learning decisions of the latter. Formally,
dLk
dLj
=
dLk
dEk
dEk
dLj
= 0 (16)
While dEk
dLj
is positive, the effect of Lj on Lk is zero.
Without this result, we would need to assume that Lk is an unknown function of Lj, and solve
a differential equation to find the optimal value of the latter. When Lk does not depend on Lj ,
solving an agent’s problem becomes a trivial task, with closed-form solutions in many cases.
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4 Results
4.1 A primer: isolated families
Consider an extreme case in which children can only learn from their parents, that is τij =∞,∀i 6=
C−1(j). Then, utility (11) simplifies to
Uj = L
γ
1−γ
j EjM
L− Lj
ν
LC(j)
EC(j)
(17)
where EC(j) takes a simple form of
EC(j) =MEjL
γ
1−γ
j (18)
By plugging (18) into (17), we end up with the following optimization problem:
max
Lj
L− Lj
ν
LC(j) (19)
From Proposition 2, LC(j) does not depend on j’s decisions. Then, it is straightforward to observe
that individual j chooses the lowest possible level of education Lj = L. Intuitively, when children
can learn only from their parents, the latter are effectively monopolists in the ideological market
for their children and have no incentives to improve the quality of their own ideas. Parents choose
to maximize the number of their children: having secured the share of their ideological market at
100%, they maximize the size of that market.
Therefore, when families have limited ability to communicate with one another, we end up with
a standard Darwinian/Malthusian equilibrium in which parents maximize the number of children
and have the minimal level of education.
4.2 Learning from parent’s neighbors
For further analysis, it is convenient to define a spatial allocation of agents, which enables us to
measure distance between any two agents and define a “neighborhood” of one’s parent. I assume
that all members of a given generation are distributed uniformly on a circle. The density of agents
on the circle is constant, so the circle expands with population growth.
To define the structure of the learning costs, I divide the set Gt−1 of all potential teachers
of any given individual j ∈ Gt of any given generation t into three subsets. The first subset
consists of only one element, the parent of j; the cost of learning from the parent is unity as before:
τC−1(j)j = 1. The second subset is the mass N0 of the “neighbors” of C
−1(j), denote it T (j) (where
T stands for “teachers”). Formally, T (j) is a subset of Gt−1\C
−1(j) such that |T (j)| = N0 and
||i, C−1(j)|| ≤ ||i′, C−1(j)|| for any i ∈ T (j) and i′ ∈ Gt−1\T (j)\C
−1(j). The operator |X| here is
the mass (“number”) of all agents in the set X, while ||x, y|| measures distance between elements x
11
Gt−1
C−1(j)
T (j)
Gt
j
Gt+1
C(j)
S(j)
Figure 2: The geography of influence: an illustration
and y of a set. I assume that the cost of learning from parent’s neighbors is τi,j = τ ≥ 1,∀i ∈ T (j)
Finally, the third subset of all potential teachers is “non-neighbors” of j’s parent; I assume that
learning from them is impossible. Formally,
τi,j =∞,∀i ∈ Gt−1\T (j)\C
−1(j)
For any given j ∈ Gt, define S(j) as a set of all potential students of j, besides j’s own children,
who’s learning cost from j is finite. Formally, S(j) is the set of all k ∈ Gt+1 such that j ∈ T (k).
Assuming that the representative family size (number of children) is nt, the measure of the set S(j)
is ntN0 for all j ∈ Gt, for all t.
The key variable of interest here is N0, the mass of neighbors of one’s parent from which
it is possible to learn: it shows the extent to which people are exposed to the outside world.
Traditional societies, in which people interact with a small number of neighbors who live in the
same village, correspond to a small value of N0. Modern world, where most people live in large
cities and frequently travel to other cities, corresponds to large N0. Below, we analyze how family
size decisions depend on N0. An extreme case of N0 = 0, when learning from parent’s neighbors is
impossible and families are virtually isolated from each other, has been analyzed in section 4.1.
Due to symmetry, all agents k ∈ Gt+1 choose the same learning intensity Lk = Lt+1,∀k which
can therefore be factored out in the expression for utility (11). Then, j’s utility can now be rewritten
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as
Uj = Lt+1L
γ
1−γ
j Et
[
M
L− Lj
ν
1
EC(j)
+
∫
k∈S(j)
1
Ek
τ
− 1
1−γ dk
]
= Lt+1L
γ
1−γ
j Et
[
M
L− Lj
ν
1
EC(j)
+ ntN0
1
Et+1
τ
− 1
1−γ
]
(20)
where EC(j) can be rewritten from (13) as
EC(j) = Et
(
ML
γ
1−γ
j +N0
(
Lt
τ
) γ
1−γ
)
(21)
Agent j maximizes (20) over Lj subject to (21). Appendix B proves that the optimal learning
decision of a representative agent is
L ≡ Lj = max{
A
1−γ
γ
+A
L,L},∀j ∈ Gt,∀t (22)
where
A ≡
N0τ
− γ
1−γ
M +N0τ
− γ
1−γ
+
N0
M
τ
− 1
1−γ (23)
By setting N0 = 0 or τ =∞ which both correspond to the isolated families case (see section 4.1),
we can verify that agents choose the lowest possible level of education L. Also note that having
no children (that is, choosing Lj = L) is not possible in equilibrium: if none of j’s neighbors has
children, then j has no one to influence except his own children, hence a marginal decrease in
the level of education and increase in the family size from zero to a small positive number would
increase the influence/utility of j.
Note that the constant A consists of two components, both of which are positively related to
N0. The first component reflects the fact that when the network size N0 increases, one’s children
are affected by an increasing number of non-parents. To retain influence on his own children, one
has to study more. The second component is due to the fact that as the network size N0 increases,
one gets an opportunity to influence an increasing number of someone else’s children. To maximize
one’s utility, it becomes optimal to reduce the number of own children and increase the quality of
own idea.
We can also compute the optimal family size:
n = min{
L
ν
1
1 + γ1−γA
,
1
ν
(L− L)} (24)
which decreases with an increase in the network size N0. In the modern world, families are smaller,
for the two reasons outlined above.
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Another parameter of interest is the growth rate of the quality of ideas. From (8) and (14),
qt+1
qt
=
E
1−γ
γ
t+1 L
E
1−γ
γ
t L
=
(
Et+1
Et
) 1−γ
γ
= L
(
M +N0τ
− γ
1−γ
) 1−γ
γ
(25)
As the size of the network N0 expands, and the rate of knowledge growth accelerates for two reasons.
First, with access to knowledge of a wider network of predecessors, agents are able to learn more
given the same learning time.3 Second, a wider network of competitors induces people to spend
more time on learning ( dL
dN0
> 0), which also accelerates the rate of improvement of ideas.
4.3 Endogenous network size
Previous section assumes that the number of people from which one can learn is fixed. Now
suppose that an agent can learn from all members of the previous generation, that is, the network
size N0 for j ∈ Gt is equal to Nt−1 ≡ |Gt−1|. With the increase of literacy rates, knowledge of
foreign languages, and development of modern information technology, this assumption becomes
increasingly realistic. As directly follows from this assumption, the network size now varies with the
population size, and therefore the constant A defined in (23) is no longer a constant: it increases
with the increase in population; denote by At the value of A for generation t. Formula n describes
the family size, which decreases with A. Therefore, when the world population is small, the value
of At is low, families are large, and the rate of population growth is high. As the world population
gets larger, family size decreases until the size of the world population eventually arrives to a steady
state. Given that nt decreases with At, while At increases with population size, such a steady state
is unique. This result is consistent with the forecast of the United Nations that population size will
stabilize by the end of the 21-st century.
The rate of knowledge growth, vice versa, will accelerate as population rises. This result is
similar to Michael Kremer’s work on population growth and technological change (Kremer 1993),
but the mechanism of acceleration is different. According to Kremer, knowledge grows faster in
larger populations because of non-rivalry of knowledge. Assuming that a new invention can be
utilized by everyone and assuming a constant number of innovators per capita, larger population
means larger total number of innovators which means faster growth of technology. In my model,
larger population means that each person has more people to influence and thus will accumulate
more knowledge in order to look more appealing and to stay on par with his/her contemporaries
who also acquire more knowledge.
3Mathematically, this effect is identical to the “love of variety” property of the Dixit-Stiglitz preferences widely
used in International Trade literature
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5 The effect of outside influence
People living in the province, especially in rural areas, have a very limited ability to influence the
rest of the world; in this respect, they are not very much different from traditional societies that
dominated the world two centuries ago. Nevertheless, demographic transition has occurred in the
province too.
I propose the following explanation of the phenomenon. Agents choose to have fewer children
not only when they face an opportunity to influence non-children, but also when their children
can be influenced by the outside world. In traditional societies, parents are monopolists in the
“ideological market” of their children, and hence have no incentive to improve the quality of their
ideas. In the modern world, children can learn not only from their parents, but also from many
other sources – travelers visiting their community, radio, television, and finally the internet. In this
environment, a parent of fifteen children, who has spent all his life on raising children and thus
has little education, will have very little influence even on his own children: they would choose to
learn from television instead. A rational parent should reduce the family size and acquire more
education, in order to be able to compete with the ideas delivered by the outside world.
In this section, I develop an extension of the model that formalizes the above intuition. I
assume that at the beginning of their lives, all people are randomly divided into two groups –
artists (fraction α of population) and peasants (fraction 1−α). Formally, the set Gt of all agents of
generation t is partitioned into the subset of artists GAt and peasants G
P
t . As before, all agents are
distributed uniformly on a circle. Given randomness of division into artists and peasants, agents
within each of these groups are also uniformly distributed on that circle. Each agent j ∈ Gt, either
artist or peasant, can learn from two sources. First, he can learn from own parent C−1(j), with the
learning cost τ−1C (j)j = 1 as before. Second, he can learn from the mass N0 of the nearest artists;
denote the set of these artists by T (j). The cost of learning from artists is τij = τ ≥ 1, i ∈ T (j).
Learning from artists other than those belonging to T (j), as well as from peasants other than one’s
parent, is impossible. Note that when α = 0, we are back to the isolated families scenario analyzed
in section (4.1).
I make an additional assumption that artists have no children and spend all their life developing
their ideas. This assumption is motivated by the following several arguments. First, the main goal
of this section is to analyze the effect of artists’ influence on the fertility decisions of peasants;
fertility decisions of artists themselves are of secondary interest. Second, when α is small enough,
each artist has access to the minds of a large number of people, and having no children is an
incentive compatible strategy. Third, when artists have no families, everyone’s parent must be a
peasant; therefore, any agent j ∈ Gt, whether artist or peasant, has the same learning environment
Ej = Et. As discussed above, symmetry of the learning environment simplifies the analysis by
making one’s learning decisions independent of his learning environment. Lastly, it is an empirical
fact that many celebrities choose not to have children until their late-thirties, and spend little of
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their personal time on their nurture thereafter.
We now proceed to the analysis of learning and fertility decisions made by peasants. From (10),
the learning environment faced by an agent j ∈ Gt, either artist or peasant, is
Ej =MEC−1(j)
(
LC−1(j)
) γ
1−γ +
∫
i∈T (j)
Ei
(
Li
τ
) γ
1−γ
di
Note that learning environments of the predecessors are symmetric: EC−1(j) = Ei ≡ Et−1. Also,
the learning choices of the artists are also symmetric and equal to their upper bound: Li = L.
These considerations allow us to rewrite the above expression as follows:
Ej = Et−1
(
M
(
LC−1(j)
) γ
1−γ +N0
(
L
τ
) γ
1−γ
)
(26)
We now adapt the expression for utility (11) for the environment defined in this section. The utility
of artists is immaterial, since their choice of learning time is assumed rather than computed. The
utility of peasants j ∈ GPt is
Uj = L
γ
1−γ
j EjM
L− Lj
ν
LC(j)
EC(j)
Note that peasants can influence only their own children.
From Proposition 2, children’s learning choices LC(j) = Lt+1 do not depend on parent’s decisions
and can be treated by parents as given. The utility can be rewritten as follows:
Uj = Lt+1
L− Lj
ν
ML
γ
1−γ
j
ML
γ
1−γ
j +N0
(
L
τ
) γ
1−γ
(27)
If learning from artists is not possible (N0 = 0 or τ = ∞), parents do not have any competition
with the outside world for the minds of their children and are best-off choosing minimal education
and maximal family size. In a more general case, a closed-form solution for the optimal learning
time does not exist; appendix C proves that increased access to artists’ ideas induces peasants to
learn more and have smaller families:
dLj
dN0
> 0,
dnj
dN0
< 0. Increased influence from the outside world
induces parents to invest more in their own education, in order to be able to influence their own
children.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops an “influential” theory of demographic transition, according to which the ob-
jective of agents in generation t is to influence the minds of the next generation. In traditional
societies with poor communication technologies, it is difficult to influence anyone other than own
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children; in addition, children are unlikely to be influenced by anyone other than own parents. Both
of these considerations induce parents to maximize the size of families and minimize educational
effort. In modern societies with easy long-distance communication, competition for influence inten-
sifies, which induces agents to spend more time on development of own ideas at the cost of smaller
families.
The following extensions of this research may be of interest. First, a more general asymmetric
learning environment (i.e. the environment in which agents have asymmetric access to the ideas
of predecessors) can be studied. The difficulty of the analysis arises from the fact that in the
asymmetric setting, the learning environment Ej of an agent j ∈ Gt does not cancel out from his
utility function and affects his optimal choice of learning time Lj . Since j’s learning environment
depends on educational decision of j’s parent LC−1(j), we conclude that optimal Lj is a function of
LC−1(j). Extrapolating this conclusion one generation forward, we find that the optimal learning
decision of j’s children, LC(j), is an unknown function of j’s own decision Lj. Therefore, computation
of the optimal Lj (and therefore optimal family size) requires solving a differential equation, and
most likely will not result in a closed-form solution.
Another potential extension is a generalization of the utility function. Since ideas of generation
t − 1 are embedded in the ideas of generation t, the influence of the latter on generation t + 1
is also an indirect influence of t − 1 on t + 1. This indirect influence can be made part of the
objective function of the members of generation t − 1. This extension may help to explain why a
parent i ∈ Gt−1 may choose to send her child C(i) ∈ Gt to learn from other (more educated) people
i′ ∈ Gt−1 at the universities. By doing so, i reduces the share of her own ideas in C(i), but increases
the influence of C(i) on generation t + 1; on balance, i may be better-off. For example, parents
of Rudolph Diesel might have increased their own social influence by making their son learn from
smart teachers and thus making him more influential.
Another possible extension of the model is modification of the production function of ideas
(2). Instead of assuming that the elasticity of substitution between any two ideas is constant,
one could assume that all ideas (and thus all people) are divided into two sets, or two religions.
Elasticity of substitution between two ideas from different religions is infinite, and therefore an
individual can choose to learn from representatives of only one religion. Given that parents enter
the learning environment of their children with a strictly positive weight, the latter are naturally
biased towards the religion of their parents. But if the “other” religion is sufficiently influential,
children may choose to switch to that other religion, dramatically reducing the influence (utility) of
their parents. In this environment, one could formalize a theory that celibacy of Christian priests
has helped them increase their influence in the society and convert a large part of the world into
Christianity (see (Blackmore 2000) for a verbal description of the theory).
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A Derivation of demand for ideas
Maximization of (2) subject to (3) over all learning intensities xij is equivalent to the following
unconstrained maximization:
max
xij ,∀i∈Gt−1
{
qj − λ
[
Lj −MxC−1(j)jτC−1(j)j −
∫
i∈Gt−1\C−1(j)
xijτijdi
]}
(28)
where qj is defined in (2), and λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Maximization with respect to an
arbitrary xij yields
q
1−γ
γ
j x
−(1−γ)
ij q
γ
i − λτij = 0 (29)
Note that this expression applies to both learning from a parent i = C−1(j) and a non-parent
i 6= C−1(j). We can now solve for xij:
xij = Cjq
γ
1−γ
i τ
− 1
1−γ
ij (30)
where Cj is some positive constant. We can now substitute (30) into (3), keeping in mind (4), to
obtain
Cjq
γ
1−γ
C−1j
+
∫
i∈Gt−1\C−1(j)
Cj
(
γ
1− γ
) γ
1−γ
di = Lj (31)
By using the definition of the learning environment (6), we can simplify the above formula to simply
CjEj = Lj , or Cj =
Lj
Ej
. By substituting the latter expression into (30), we end up with the optimal
learning intensities presented in (7).
B Learning from parent’s neighbors: derivation of optimal learn-
ing time
In the expression for utility (20), the multiplier Lt+1Et is positive and constant and thus can be
ignored when searching for argmaximum. The first order condition is then as follows:4
γ
1− γ
L
γ
1−γ
−1
j
[
M
L− Lj
ν
1
EC(j)
+ ntN0
1
Et+1
τ
− 1
1−γ
]
−L
γ
1−γ
j M
1
ν
1
EC(j)
−L
γ
1−γ
j M
L− Lj
ν
1
E2C(j)
dEC(j)
dLj
= 0
(32)
4To simplify exposition, we abstract from upper and lower bounds on Lj ; the solution (22) presented in the main
body of the paper does account for the bounds.
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In symmetric equilibrium, EC(j) = Et+1 which now can be factored out; Lj = Lt. By dividing the
above expression by L
γ
1−γ
−1
j
1
Et+1
, we obtain
γ
1− γ
[
M
L− Lt
ν
+ ntN0τ
− 1
1−γ
]
− LtM
1
ν
− LtM
L− Lt
ν
1
Et+1
dEC(j)
dLj
= 0 (33)
Here, the last component can be simplified to
LtM
L− Lt
ν
1
Et+1
dEC(j)
dLj
= LtM
L− Lt
ν
1
EtL
γ
1−γ
t
(
M +N0τ
− γ
1−γ
) Et γ
1− γ
ML
γ
1−γ
−1
t
= M
L− Lt
ν
γ
1− γ
M
M +N0τ
− γ
1−γ
(34)
Substituting (34) back into (33) and substituting the formula for optimal family size nt =
L−Lt
ν
,
we obtain
γ
1− γ
L− Lt
ν
[
M +N0τ
− 1
1−γ
]
− LtM
1
ν
−M
L− Lt
ν
γ
1− γ
M
M +N0τ
− γ
1−γ
= 0 (35)
After some manipulations, we obtain
γ
1− γ
L− Lt
ν
[
M
N0τ
− γ
1−γ
M +N0τ
− γ
1−γ
−N0τ
− 1
1−γ
]
= LtM
1
ν
(36)
By dividing both sides by M
ν
, we get
γ
1− γ
(
L− Lt
)
A = Lt (37)
where A is defined in (23). Trivial manipulations with the above formula yield the optimal learning
time (22).
C Outside influence: derivation of optimal learning time
Define
G(x, y) ≡
Mx
γ
1−γ
Mx
γ
1−γ + y
(
L
τ
) γ
1−γ
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Then, logarithm of utility (27) is
F (Lj , N0) ≡ logUj(Lj , N0) = log
Lt+1
ν
+ log(L− Lj) + logG(Lj , N0) (38)
Abstracting from the bounds on Lj , the first-order condition for the optimal learning time is
dF
dLj
= −
1
L− Lj
+
dG
dLj
(Lj , N0)
G(Lj , N0)
= 0 (39)
By computing dG
dLj
, we can show that
dF
dLj
= −
1
L− Lj
+
γ
1− γ
1
Lj
(1−G(Lj , N0)) (40)
From the implicit function theorem,
dLj
dN0
= −
d2F
dLjdN0
d2F
dL2j
(41)
It is straightforward to verify that d
2F
dLjdN0
> 0 and d
2F
dL2j
< 0; therefore,
dLj
dN0
> 0.
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